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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L. JACK GRAHAM, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ) 
OF UTAH, R. THORNE FOUNDATION ) 
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No • 18 3 6 3 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This case is an appeal from an order by the Industrial 
Commission affirming the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order of the administrative law judge. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
The administrative law judge ruled that the plaintiff, 
L. Jack Graham, was not entitled to workers compensation 
benefits as against his employer, R. Thorne Foundation and 
its insurance carrier State Insurance Fund for the reason 
that plaintiff was an independent contractor and not an 
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employee. This ruling was affirmed by the Indus~rial 
Commission by a majority vote. 
by 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
the administrative 
see,<s a reversal of the Order made 
law judge and affirmed by the 
Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff herein, a roofer by trade approached 
Thorne, a general contractor CR. 72), seeking work as a 
roofer when plaintiff observed homes under construction by 
Thorne (R. 12, 13). Plaintiff contacted defendant Thorne by 
telephone. Def end ant was asked " ... if he had a roof er, or 
if he needed a roofer" CR. 13). Plaintiff described l:is 
method of application CR. 13); that he used nails instead of 
staples; that he "dried" the roof before ·applying shingles 
( R. 14). Defendant contacted plaintiff and indicated 
" .•. that he would like me to shingle his roofs. He told me 
that the roof I had approached him on was not quite ready to 
be shingled, but that he had three others in another subdivi-
sion" CR. 15). A price was agreed upon--$8.00 per square if 
dried in by plaintiff and $6.50 per square if done by others 
CR. 14 through 16) . The plaintiff provided the nails a;,d 
billed defendant for them. A starting time was agreed upon 
-2-
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and plaintiff commenced work CR. 17). When plaintiff 
arrived at the job, some bundles were in place on the roof, 
having been delivered by defendants' men. 
On December 10, 1980, plaintiff slipped while carrying 
a bundle of shingles up a ladder spraining his wrist CR. 
17). Plaintiff was unable to work for one week (R. 27). In 
February 1981 plaintiff had a second and far more serious 
fall CR. 28). 
Defendants denied liability on basis of plaintiff being 
an independent contractor, and not an employee. Plaintiff 
contends that he was contractor over whom defendant retained 
supervision and control. 
On the facts of control or right to control: plaintiff 
and defendant negotiated the price per square CR. 14); plain-
tiff supplied nails and charged them to defendant CR. 14); 
defendant determined time to start a house CR. 15); plain-
tiff was directed to use cxld pieces of shingles for first 
course and delivery of same by defendant CR. 17); defendant 
prescribed the method of installing flashing CR. 18); defen-
dant required plaintiff to wait for completion of plumbing 
CR. 19); billing on a time basis for extra work CR. 20); 
ordering short when requested by defendant < R. 23 > ; 
direction to leave two of defendants' homes in order to 
start a third home CR. 28); defendants' decision to have 
plaintiff dry the roof as he shingled CR. 28, 29); general 
-3-
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discussions with defendant as to how he wanted certain roofs 
handled CR. 37). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE WORK DONE BY THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS IN FACT WORK PERFORMED IN THE 
USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS CARRIED ON 
BY DEFENDANTS AS REQUIRED BY 
SECTION 35-1-42, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. 
It is apparent from a review of the record and the argu-
ments by defendants before the administrative law judge tha~ 
the essential facts in the case are not in serious dispute. 
The issue is how these agreed facts are applied to section 
35-1-42 (2) U.C.A. 1953. 
Section 35-1-42 (2) provides in part: 
" ... Where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a 
contractor over whose work he retains 
superv_ision or control and such work is _ 
part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, such contractor and all perso~~ 
employed by him and a~_l subcontractors under hL , 
and all persons employed by any such subcontrac-
tor, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this 
section, employees of such orig in al employer ••. " 
(Underscoring added.) 
With reference to the quoted section the issue narrows 
itself as to whether or not there are sufficient facts upon 
which the Commission based l decision that the roofing was 
-4-
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not a "part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer." 
The administrative law judge in his decision failed 
completely to address this problem. His sole and only deter-
mination was to find that the plaintiff " ... was an indepen-
dent contractor and as such is not entitled to workmens 
compensation benefits from the defendant." The administra-
tive law judge's decision was based upon the fact that the 
defendant was not an employee to which finding defendant 
does not disagree. 
The Commission on appeal affirmed this decision by a 2 
to 1 vote. The dissenting c-ommissioner. only touched on the 
problem by stating: "The practice of the general contractor 
to call all employees 'independent contractors' is a deliber-
ate avoidance of the employer's statutory responsibility to 
provide workers compensation coverage." 
Most attorneys in dealing with this statute C 35-1-42 
(2)) refer to the status as "statutory employment" or a 
11 statutory employee." Most of the attributes of common law 
employment are not present but the effect of this statute is 
to create an employment relationship and corresponding 
responsibility in modifying the common law. 
In going through the statute step by step as under-
scored above, the key elements will be discussed. 
-5-
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The work of applying shingles to the roof of the 
house erected and co~·, structed by defendants was a part 
and parcel of the business of defendant as a home build-
ing contractor thus making ~he plaintiff a statutory 
employee of defendant. CUndersco~ing added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has held substanti~lly this way 
in Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P2d 994, 27 U2d 155 
(1977). 
The court stated: 
''The 'trade or business of the employer,' 
defencant Brown, was the ~otal project, the con-
struction of the dormitory. Id., p. 99~." 
The record shows that the defendant did not a7nploy an:1 
one except a bookkeeper and cleanup men. 
Defendant was asked about employees: 
"A. I have employees that are general maintenance 
type people, that run errands and do miscella-
neous ::hings. 
Q. And maybe a bookkeep·?..~~:, off ice people, or 
something like this? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But all of tht:. work in connection with your 
homes, your home construction itself is all 
contracted out? 
A. That's correct. 99%. 
Q. Then what is the consideration? 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. The consideration is that it is just a matter 
of liability .•. " 
The defendant is a licensed building contractor, yet he 
employs no craftsmen to build. He represents to the public 
that the defendant builds the home yet he employs no one to 
engage in that activity. 
As stated in Smith, supra, "the trade or business of 
Brown was the total project." Here the trade or business 
of the defendant was the totality of the project--construct 
and sell completed homes. 
Plaintiff concedes that he is not a common law employee 
as determined by the commission. However, the mere fact 
that defendant hires no employees of the building crafts 
type does not mean that the so-called "independent 
contractors" are not "statutory employees.n 
The general rule requiring construction workers to be 
covered by worker's compensation is restated in Bambrough 
v. Bethers 552 P2d 1286, 1291 (Utah 1976) wherein the court 
stated: 
Recent decisions of this court have held that a 
worker can be hired and paid by a sub-contractor 
but still be an employee of the general contractor 
(citing Smith v Brown). Further it is the right 
to control which is determinative; the degree of 
control is not essential." 
The record is clear that def end ant is engaged in the 
homebuilding industry; that an integral part of such 
-7-
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construction is roofing; that plaintiff was an independant 
worker who perf orrned a necessary part or process in the 
building of defendants' homes and that plaintiff is entitled 
to that status. 
POI:·JT II 
THE DEFENDANT DID SUPERVISE 
OR HAD THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE 
THE WORK OF PLAINTIFF. 
In the initial statement of facts the record was set 
forth giving the instances of apparent control or the right 
to control. (The final paragraph above of the statement of 
facts.) 
The foregoing details essentially all of the instances 
of either actual control over the details of the work or the 
right to control the work. In addition there is little 
doubt that defendant could terminate the relationship at 
will. The method of payment was strictly piece work for 
each square laid and not for the total project. Nothing was 
reduced to writing, no bids were extended to other roof ~rs. 
The only consideration was the piece work basis cf compensa-
tion. 
The elements of right to control appear to be present 
in this case at best and the exercise of such rights may not 
be established in fact. The right to control is what we 
are here concerned with. 
-8-
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It is well settled in this state that the status of an 
employee is essentially determined by either the supervision 
in fact of the details of the work of the employee or the 
right to exercise such supervision. 
In Sommerville v. Industrial Commission, 118 U504, 
196 P2d 718 Cl948) this court resolved the question of 
status by declaring it to be a jurisdictional question. The 
court said in part: 
"The question of whether or not one engaged in 
a service for another is an employee or an indepen-
dent contractor, within the meaning of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, is a jurisdictional 
question, presenting a situation which requires 
this court to determine the status from the facts 
submitted, by a preponderance of the evidence. 
But where, as here, the evidence in the case is 
largely uncontradicted, the problem is not so much 
one of examining the record to determine whether 
the evidence preponderates for or against the con-
clusion of the Commission, but rather of deter-
mining whether the Commission drew the correct 
legal conclusion therefrom." 
In Somerville, supra, no evidence was available that 
defendant was engaged in maintenance and repair activities, 
no evidence was available that the coffee shop operated by 
defendants was the subject of the maintenance and repair but 
a building separate and distinct from the employer, no evi-
dence was available that defendant participated and super-
vised the details of the maintenance activity. No other 
employees of the employer were engaged in maintenance 
activities. For these reasons alone there is sufficient 
-9-
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distinction on the facts without detailing all of the differ-
ences. 
In Anderson v. Last Chance Ranch Co., 63 U. 551, 228 
P. 184, (1924) the nature of the business arose as an issue 
because of the statutory exclusion of agricultural employ-
ees. Section 35-1-43 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides in part: 
"The words 'employee', 'workmen' and 'opera-
tive', as used in this title shall be construed to 
mean: 
(2) Every person, except agricultural laborers 
and domestic servants, in th,.. service of any 
'employer' as defined in su:Odivision (2) of 
section 35-1-42 who employs or.2 or more workmen or 
operatives regularly in the same business •.• " 
The court in construing th2 above section was only 
concerned about the "general business of the employer". The 
court held that the "ranch companyn was engaged in agricul-
tural pursuits and not building construction. The effect of 
the finding was to establish that the "employer" was in fact 
not a covered employer under t~· ~ act and the claim of the 
employee failed. 
The claim failc_~--not because the employee '.-.-as in a 
different status from that of the employer. The claim 
failed because the employer was excluded from required cover-
age because the employer was en.Jaged in agricultural 
pursuit. 
-10-
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It appears that this case actually presents an argument 
in favor of def end ants since the court applied a broader 
rule about status and said: 
In a narrow and restricted view of the trans-
action, plaintiff at the very moment of his injury 
was an agricultural laborer ... In the broader sense 
he was a carpenter's helper •.. We are not inclined 
to dispose of the case upon the narrow view above 
referred to." Anderson v. Last Chance Ranch, 
supra. 
The court then proceeded to f ind--on the broader view--
that the employer was basically agricultural and not subject 
to the act. 
In the Somerville case, supra, the court held: 
"It is now well settled in the jurisdiction 
that the crucial factor in determining whether an 
applicant for workmen's compensation is an em-
ployee or an independent contractor is whether or 
not the person for whom the services were per-
formed had the right to control the execution of 
the work." 
This court has already stated the "crucial factor" in 
determining the status is "whether or not the person for 
whom the services were performed had the right to control 
the execution of the work." Sommerville, supra. 
Let us review the facts on the elements of control. 
Plaintiff and defendant negotiated the piece work rate CR. 
14); plaintiff supplied nails and charged to defendant CR. 
15); plaintiff ordered materials from defendants' supplier 
CR 21-23); defendant decided time to start house CR. 15); 
-11-
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plaintiff was directed to use old shingles for first course 
CR. 18); defendant directed the installation of flashing CR. 
18); defendant required n" aintiff to wait for plumbing CR. 
18) ; billing by the hour for extra work CR. 28) ; direction 
to leave two homes to work on a third CR. 28); plaintiff to 
dry roof as he shingled CR. 28, 29); ·;erleral discussions 
regarding how roofs generally were to be handled CR. 37). 
The foregoing demonstrates the exe~ccise of control in 
fact. Additional and implied rights are obvious on the part 
of the defendant. Defendant had the right to terminate the 
relationship at will, the duration of the contract was 
strictly house by house, the method of ?ayment was "piece 
work" rather than by the hour or day and no taxes were with-
held or paid by defendant. 
In Plewe Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
121 u. 375, 242 P2d 561, the matter of control by a general 
contractor over a subcontractor was discussed at length. In 
that case a roofing contractor employed shinglers and paid 
them by the square to install a roof on a building erected 
by the general c tractor. An employee of the roofing con-
tractor was hurc. The roofing contractor had no insurance 
but Plewe, the general contractor, did. Plewe' s control 
consisted of advising the roofers to lay the shingles 
straight and use a chalk line. The court held that Plewe ex-
ercised sufficient control over the work to find that the 
-12-
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employees of the subcontractor were statutory employees of 
Plewe and entitled to benefits. 
In a more recent case this court again spelled out the 
criteria to ·use in arriving at this nebulous thing called 
control or right to control. In Harry L. Young and Sons, 
Inc., v. Industrial Comm. 538 P2d 316 this court said: 
"This is one of the frequently encountered cases 
which justifies the view taken by the commission 
that the employer wanted the 'best of two worlds'. 
On the one hand, to have a person rendering the 
service over whom he can maintain a high degree of 
control; and at the same time to avoid the responsi-
bilities he would have to an employee. The trouble 
arises when an employee is injured he wants to be 
classified as an employee and get workmen's compen-
sation. 
In determining whether the statutory require-
ments are met, the courts have considered numerous 
factors relating to the employer-employee relation-
ship, and have pointed out that none of them 
considered alone is completely controlling, but 
that they all should be considered together in 
determining whether the requirements of the statute 
are met. 
Speaking in generality; An employee is one who 
is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a fixed 
rate, to perform the employer's work as directed by 
the employer and who is subject to a comparatively 
high degree of control in performing those duties. 
In contrast, an independent contractor is one who 
is engaged to do some particular project or piece 
of work, usually for a set sum, who may do the job 
his own way, subject to only minimal restrictions 
or controls and is responsible only for its satis-
factory completion. 
The main facts to be considered on the relation-
ship here are: C 1) whatever covenants or agree-
ments exist concerning the right of direction and 
-13-
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control over the employee, whether express or 
implied; (2) the right to hire and fire; (3) the 
method of payment, i.e. whether in wages or fees as 
compared to payment for a complete job or project; 
and (4) the furnishing of the equipment." 
It is urged upon this court that the foregoing facts 
and applicable law are related to the status of "independent 
contractor" as opposed to "employer". It appears that in 
Plewe Construction Co., supra, the statutory employer 
"requires considerably less by way of control than the 
strict employer relationship." 
The Supreme court in discussing the statutory employee 
section of the code stated in Rustler Lodge v. Industrial 
Commission (552 P2d 227): 
"U .C .A. 1953, 35-1-42 ( 2) is pertinent to our 
disposition here and it reads in part as follows: 
••• Where any employer procures any 
work to be done wholly or in part for 
him by a contractor over whose work he 
retains supervision or control and 
such work is a part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer, 
such contractor, and all persons em-
ployed by him, and all sub-contractors 
under him, and all p~rsons employed by 
any such subcontractor, shall be 
deemed, within the meaning of this 
section, employees of such original 
employer... (Emphasis added.) 
In determining whether the Commission drew 
correct legal conclusions from the facts a further 
brief review of the facts is helpful. It appears 
clear that the lodge regularly employed mainte-
nance and handy men and Jensen in fact acknowl-
edged that they were engaged in the performance of 
-14-
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light construction activity about the lodge at the 
same time in question. 
It must be conceded that drywall and ceiling 
repairs are activities common to most businesses, 
particularly a lodge and restaurant, and that the 
services performed by Jensen were in the same 
nature of maintenance and repairs being carried on 
by other employees of the lodge and hence a part 
or process of the trade or business of the lodge. 
The fact that Jensen was taken over the entire 
job, shown what services were to be performed, not 
allowed to commence work on his first appearance, 
directed where to stack the dry wall and to use 
care in protecting the floor, furnished a protec-
tive covering and a ladder and paid at an hourly 
rate, are all indicative of adequate elements of 
control to warrant the findings of the Commission. 
It is noted that there are no facts to support a 
possible substitution of workman as discussed in 
Ludlow, supra. Quite to the contrary, the lodge 
first contacted Jensen's firm which declined to 
take the job and made a referral to applicant 
individually and such is indicative of the intent 
of the parties establishing an employee relation-
ship. 
The evidence here, viewed in the light of the 
numerous pronouncements of this court, prov ides a 
reasonable basis for the conclusion reached by the 
Commission that Jensen was an employee. 0 
In the Plewe Construction Co., supra, a statutory 
employment relationship was created. In that case the 
roofing contractor was truly independent Cthe injured was an 
employee of the roofing contractor). However Plewe C the 
general contractor) exercised, at best, minimal control. 
Such minimal control was sufficient to create the statutory 
employment relationship. 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The element of plaintiff and defendant being engaged in 
the same type of work (home construction) is clearly 
present. The element of control or right to control--to 
whatever degree one wants to find--is present. The status 
of plaintiff as an independent contractor can be inf erred. 
The ultimate fact appears that plaintiff is either a direct 
employee of defendant or a statutory employee of defendant. 
He must be one or the other. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A careful analysis of the facts as determined by the 
Industrial Commission together with factual matters over-
looked or ignored by the Industrial Commission leads to the 
conclusion t~~t the Commission erred. Plaintiff was an 
employee of the defendant--either direct or statutory. The 
Commission reached an incorrect conclusion in applying those 
facts against the appropriate law. Such decision should be 
reversed. 
DATED, this day of June 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
84102 
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